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CASE COMMENTS
ment of counsel. The Court then cites Gideon v. Wain~wrighets to
justify its decision. Tellier, however, is not concerned with an in-
digent denied the right to counsel. If the Court's reasoning is fol-
lowed to its logical conclusion, legal fees for all criminals, not just
those whose crime has occurred in a business context, should be
deductible.
The Supreme Court, by asserting that "the federal income tax is a
tax on net income, not a sanction against wrongdoing," 6 supports
the concept of moral neutrality in the tax Code. The Court's statement
brings into question any public policy doctrine in denying deductions
of otherwise "ordinary and necessary" business expenses. Rejection
of the elusive public policy criteria would be consistent with what
appears to be the attitude of Congress: tax laws relating to business
are intended to tax net income, regardless of its source. Where Con-
gress has intended to curb particular forms of business conduct by
the tax statutes, it has done so by specific legislation.57 This legisla-
tive practice combined with the inconsistencies and confusion which
result from the judicial ad hoc public policy doctrine calls for legis-
lative determination of which business expenses should be disallowed
on public policy grounds. The courts should not by themselves add
a morality gloss to our already complex tax Code.
PE= W. MARTONE
TOWARD A UNIFORM COTENANCY LAW
For the magic word "survivorship" opens a Pandora's box, re-
leasing strange spirits from the past, spirits as strange and alien
to the modern world as the Salem witches. Here comes Joint
Tenancy, with his handmaidens, Per Tout and Per My. There
in solemn black march the Four Unities, in cadence slow. Vested
Remainder dances the gavotte with his wife, Contingent to the
strains of lutes played by Severance and Ius Accrescendi.
Through the air on evanescent wings float Possibilities, now alone
and now coupled with an interest.'
55372 U.S. 335 (1963).
GOCommissioner v. Tellier, supra note 1, at 1120.
57See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162(c). "No deduction shall be allowed ...
for any expenses paid or incurred if the payment thereof is made, directly or
indirectly, to an official or employee of a foreign country, and if the maling
of the payment would be unlawful under the laws of the United States if such
laws were applicable to such payment and to such official or employee:'
Section 162 (e) disallows certain lobbying expenses.
'Stephenson, Survivorship Deeds Under the Statute, 34 Conn. BJ. 15-16 (1960).
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The desirability of some form of joint ownership is demonstrated
by its use in the common law for over 6 centuries2 as well as its
availability in every jurisdiction today.3 The common law provided
3 forms of joint ownership which are still in use: Tenancy in
Common, Joint Tenancy, and Tenancy by the Entirety.4
(1) Tenancy in Common was the simplest: each tenant owned only
an undivided part of the estate5 subject to compulsory partition by
either of the tenants or forced sale for division of the proceeds of
the sale6 with no right of survivorship.7
(2) Joint Tenancy was that joint estate with a destructible right of
survivorship. In this form of ownership the right of 1 tenant to
receive the whole estate at the death of the other(s) could be cut
off by compulsory partition,8 forced sale for division of the proceeds
from the sale,9 or a sale without the permission of the other tenant.10
This estate was favored by the common law and any transfer to 2
or more tenants was presumed to be a joint tenancy, which auto-
matically carried a right of survivorship. 11
(3) Tenancy by the Entirety, a form of joint ownership available
only to married tenants,' 2 contained an indestructible right of sur-
vivorship. 13 Since at common law husband and wife were 1 person
2See English, Concurrent Estates in Real Property I (pt. 1), 11 Catholic
U.L. Rev. 63 (1962).
SSee 4 Powell, Real Property 602 (1965); 2 Tiffany, Real Property § 424
(3d ed. 1939).
4Tenancy by Coparcenary is of little or no significance today. See 1 Aigler,
Smith & Tefft, Property 703 (1960); 4 Powell, Real Property 600 (1965);
2 Tiffany, Real Property 429 (3d ed. 1939).
5State v. Hoskins, 357 Mo. 377, 208 S.W.2d 221, 222 (1948); Taylor v. Millard,
118 N.Y. 244, 23 N.E. 376, 377 (1890); See McConnel v. Kibbe, 43 Ill. 12 (1867).6Willard v. Willard, 145 U.S. 116, 120-21 (1892). "Partition" refers to division
of the property itself among joint owners. Ibid. When property held by tenants in
common is incapable of equitable division it may be sold and the proceeds from
the sale divided equally among the tenants. Henry v. White, 224 Ala. 427, 140 So.
391 (1932).7Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Harvey, 143 Conn. 233, 121 A.2d 276,
280 (1956); In re Hoermann's Estate, 234 Wis. 130, 290 N.W. 608, 610 (1940);
Woodward v. Congdon, 34 R.I. 316, 83 Ad. 433, 435 (1912).8Gwinn v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 224, 228 (1932); Midgley v. Walker,
101 Mich. 583, 60 N.W. 296 (1894).
91bid.
101bid.; Green v. Skinner, 185 Cal. 435, 197 Pac. 60, 61 (1921).
l'Swartzbaugh v. Sampson, 11 Cal. App. 2d 451, 54 P.2d 73, 75 (1936); Allen
v. Almy, 87 Conn. 517, 89 Ad. 205, 207 (1913); Prall v. Burckhartt, 299 IM. 19,
132 N.E. 280, 283 (1921).12Simons v. Bollinger, 154 Ind. 83, 56 N.E. 23, 24 (1900); see Taub v.
Shampanier, 95 NJ.L. 349, 112 Ad. 322 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
13 "Indestructible" in this sense means that it cannot be cut off by a third
d27
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and the estate belonged to that entity and not to either alone, the
right of survivorship could not be cut off by compulsory partition,
forced sale for division, or attempted transfer by 1 spouse without
the permission of the other spouse. 14
Two serious objections have been made to survivorship as it was
used at common law. First, widespread use of survivorship among
laymen without full recognition of all its ramifications often resulted
in frustration of the real intent of the parties.15 This was especially
undesirable where the survivorship was created not by an act of the
parties but by the common law presumption in favor of joint tenancy.
The second objection was that the indestructible nature of the right
of survivorship in tenancy by the entirety could be used to defeat
the rights of the tenants' creditors.' 6
Different jurisdictions have attempted to meet these 2 objections
in many different ways. A very small minority has tried to meet both
objections by abolishing joint tenancy and tenancy by the entirety,
leaving only tenancy in common, an estate without a right of sur-
vivorship.17
The more usual method of meeting the objection of the unin-
party or by an act of one tenant alone. Phillips v. Krakower, 46 F.2d 764, 765
(4th Cir. 1931); Hoffmann v. Newell, 249 Ky. 270, 60 S.W.2d 607, 609 (1932).
14This idea was commonly expressed by saying such tenants hold per tout
and not per my; see Taub v. Shampanier, 95 N.J.L. 349, 112 Ad. 322 (Sup. Ct.
1921).
151n Bernhard the parties apparently had no idea they were creating an
indestructible right of survivorship. It can hardly be seriously asserted that the
words "as tenants by the entirety with the right of survivorship" sufficiently alerts
the layman to the indestructible nature of the estate he is creating.
'6 Since the survivorship cannot be destroyed and there is no way to ascertain
who the survivor will be, there can be no attachment since the debtor's interest
in the property is unascertained. A second reason for non-attachment is the
common law fiction that the estate belongs to both of the tenants as one but to
neither of them alone. English, Concurrent Estates in Real Property II, (pt. 2) 12
Catholic U.L. Rev. 1, 2 (1963).
17Washington withdrew from this dwindling minority with Wash. Sess. Laws
1961, ch. 2, which repealed Wash. Rev. Code § 11.04.070 (1953). Alabama was
briefly in this minority before Ala. Code tit. 47, § 19 (1958) was amended in
1945, 4 Powell, Real Property 602 n.15 (1965). Oregon tried to abolish joint
tenancy by statute, now Ore. Rev. Star. § 93.180 (1953), but the Supreme Court
of Oregon apparently construed the statute to mean that no more than the old
common law presumption in favor of joint tenancy was destroyed. For an
explanation of the status of the Oregon law as well as the ambiguity of the
revised statute see O'Connell, Are Joint Tenancies Abolished In Oregon?, 21
,Ore. L. Rev. 159 (1942). Alaska apparently follows the Oregon view of joint
,tenancy, Alaska Stat. § 34.15.130 (1962), Pilip v. United States, 186 F. Supp. 397,
402 (D. Alaska 1960), although Alaska Stat. § 34.15.140 (1962), expressly allows
creation of a limited tenancy by the entirety.
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tentional use of survivorship, however, has been by statutory aboli-
tion of the common law presumption in favor of joint tenancy and
creation of a statutory presumption in favor of a tenancy in com-
mon. 8 Under such statutes a grant to 2 or more grantees is pre-
sumed to create a tenancy in common, an estate without survivorship,
instead of a joint tenancy, an estate with survivorship. This presump-
tion can always be rebutted by an express provision in the instrument
showing a clear intent to create a joint tenancy, on the rationale that
such an estate is permissible if the grantor realizes what he is doing.19
In slightly more than half the jurisdictions the method of dealing
with the creditors' objection to tenancy by the entirety has been to
abolish tenancy by the entirety outright,20 leaving joint tenancy as
the only jointly held estate with survivorship. Although a few juris-
dictions have simply held that tenancy by the entirety does not com-
pletely insulate against creditors,21 a sizable minority has refused to
change the common law rule that a tenancy by the entirety is not
subject to levy or attachment for any debt not incurred by both
spouses jointly.
22
Alabama judicially abolished tenancy by the entirety in 1860.23 The
presumption in favor of joint tenancy was abolished by a statute which
allowed joint tenancy only if the intent to create it were clearly
expressed:
When one joint tenant dies before the severance, his interest does
18See, e.g., Lynch v. Murray, 139 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1943); Prall v. Burck-
hartt, 299 Ill. 19, 132 N.E. 280 (1921); Salvation Army, Inc. v. Hart, 239 Ind. 1,
154 N.E.2d 487 (1958); Midgley v. Walker, 100 Mich. 583, 60 N.W. 296 (1894);
In re Blumenthal's Estate, 236 N.Y. 448, 141 N.E. 911 (1923).
19 Allen v. Almy, 87 Conn. 517, 89 Atl. 205, 207 (1913); Frey v. Wubbena,
26 IMI. 2d 62, 185 N.E.2d 850 (1962); Wilken v. Young, 149 Ind. 1, 41 N.E. 68
(1895).
2OAnother method of achieving the same result is to refuse to recognize it.
For an excellent grouping and classification of the methods by which tenancy by
the entirety is not recognized in 29 jurisdictions see Phipps, Tenancy By
Entireties, 25 Temp. L.Q. 24, 32-33 (1951).
21in Kentucky and Tennessee the creditor can levy and sell the interest of the
debtor spouse. The buyer at execution thus gets only the contingent right of
Isurvivorship, see Hoffmann v. Newell, 249 Ky. 270, 60 S.W.2d 607 (1932); Francis
v. Vastine, 229 Ky. 431, 17 S.W.2d 419 (1929); Cole Mfg. Co. v. Collier, 95
Tenn. 115, 31 S.W. 1000 (1895). In Arkansas the purchaser at execution takes
the debtor spouse's interest in half the rents and profits as well as the con-
,tingent right of survivorship, see Moore v. Denson, 167 Ark. 134, 268 S.vV. 609
(1924); Branch v. Polk, 61 Ark. 388, 33 S.W. 424 (1895).
22For a grouping and classification of the 20 jurisdictions which have retained
tenancy by the entirety, see Phipps, Tenancy By Entireties, 25 Temp. L.Q.
24, 33-34, 46-57 (1951).
23See Walthall v. Goree, 36 Ala. 728 (1860).
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not survive to the other joint tenants, but descends and vests as
if his interest had been severed and ascertained, provided, how-
ever, that in the event it is stated in the instrument creating such
tenancy, that such tenancy is with right of survivorship, or other
words used therein showing such intention, then upon the death
of one joint tenant, his interest shall pass to the surviving joint
tenant or tenants according to the intent of such instrument. This
shall include those instruments . . . in which . . . it clearly appears
that the intent is to create such a survivorship between joint ten-
ants as is herein contemplated. 24
Thus, as in the majority of jurisdictions, after this statute was adopted
the law of Alabama appeared to be that while a tenancy by the entirety
with an indestructible right of survivorship could not be created under
any circumstances, a joint tenancy with a destructible right of sur-
vivorship could be created if the intent to do so were clearly
expressed.
The Supreme Court of Alabama, however, interpreted this statute
in a very unusual way in Bernhard v. Bernhard.25 There the husband
filed a bill to force a sale for division of the proceeds from the house
and land which he and his estranged wife had been granted. The
deed stated that the parties were to take
as joint tenants with right of survivorship . . . it being the inten-
tion of the parties to this conveyance, that (unless the joint ten-
ancy hereby created is severed or terminated during the joint
lives of the grantees herein), in the event one grantee herein
survives the other, the entire interest in fee simple shall pass to
the surviving grantee .... 26
According to the view uniformly adhered to in jurisdictions which,
like Alabama, have abolished tenancy by the entirety but allow crea-
tion of joint tenancy by express intention, such language would have
created a joint tenancy (with a destructible right of survivorship)
in accordance with the intent of the parties .2 7 Not recognizing this,
the Bernhard court took the novel position that the estate of joint
tenancy, instead of the common law presumption in favor of joint
tenancy, had been abolished by the statute.28 The reason seems to be
24Ala. Code tit. 47, § 19 (1958).
25177 So. 2d 565 (Ala. 1965).
261d. at 566.
27Supra notes 18, and 19.
28Bernhard, supra note 25, at 567, cites only 1 case as authority for this
construction, Finch v. Haynes, 144 Mich. 352, 107 N.W. 910 (1906), which is
cited incorrectly since it expressly distinguished the situation presented by
1966]
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the incorrect assumption that the first part of the statute abolishing
joint tenancy was inconsistent with the latter part allowing it.29 Ap-
parently believing itself forced to choose between 2 inconsistent
statutory clauses, the court implied that the more logical construction
was that the legislature had intended to retain only 1 incident of
joint tenancy, survivorship, rather than the entire estate of joint
tenancy. To replace the abolished estate of joint tenancy the court
fashioned a strange estate called a "tenancy in common with an inde-
structible right of survivorship" which the court equated to a tenancy
in common for the joint lives of the tenants with cross-contingent
remainders in both tenants.30 This estate has been used before in other
jurisdictions,3 ' usually when an attempted joint tenancy fails for want
of one of the 4 uniies;32 but this case is the first instance of
forcibly establishing it over the intention of both the legislature and
the parties to the instrument.
The court fictionalized the intent of the parties in order to achieve
this result by saying that the intention of the parties was other than
it patently was. It seized upon a provision in the deed which in effect
Bernhard. The Michigan Supreme Court, in carefully limiting their result to
grants "to A & B and the survivor of them," considered a precedent where, as
in Bernhard, the grant was "to A & B as joint tenants with a right of survivor-
ship" and held:
That was a case where the interest of one of two joint tenants under a
deed, where the right of survivorship was expressly granted, was purchased
under an execution sale ... and this court held that such interest was subject
to levy and sale .... If the deed under consideration had . . . made the
grantees therein nmned joint tenants of the fee, either of those grantees
could, by conveyance in her lifetime, have deprived the other of the right of
survivorsbip .... But that deed [to A & B and the survivor of them] did
not make the grantees joint tenants of the fee. 'Deeds and devices . . . to
two or more, and to the survivor of them and his heirs ... make them
joint tenants for life with a contingent remainder in fee to the one who
survives'.
Id. at 910-11 (1906) (Emphasis added.)
29Supra note 25, at 566-67.
3OThe term "tenancy in common with cross-contingent remainders" means
that each tenant has a life interest in the estate with all of the rights and
duties of tenants in common followed by a remainder in fee simple in the
whole estate contingent upon his surviving the other tenant. Since the survivor
is unascertainable while both tenants are living, the land cannot be partitioned
or sold for division of the proceeds since the interest of such party cannot
be determined until the death of one.
31See, e.g., Hass v. Hass, 248 Wis. 212, 21 N.W.2d 398 (1946); Burns v.
Nolette, 83 N.H. 489, 144 Atl. 848 (1929); Schultz v. Brohl, 116 Mich. 603, 74
N.W. 1012 (1898).
32See, e.g., Anson v. Murphy, 149 Neb. 716, 32 N.W.2d 271 (1948).
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only restated the Alabama Simultaneous Death Act3 3-if both parties
died simultaneously there could be no survivor hence the property
must descend as if the estate had been a tenancy in common. Since
by statute this rule operates in every joint tenancy, the provision
added nothing. However, one provision which is not present in every
joint tenancy is the clause, "unless the joint tenancy hereby created
is severed or terminated during the joint lives of the grantees herein."
(Emphasis added.) The intent of the parties concerning the possi-
bility of termination could hardly be plainer.
The result in Bernhard, however, does not seem inequitable. The
court did not allow the husband to sell the house in which his
estranged wife was living and divide the proceeds from the sale,
because the estate created by the court, tenancy in common with
cross-contingent remainders, was not subject to compulsory sale for
division.3 4 Two analyses can be suggested as rational bases for the
result in Bernhard: First, it can be called a protection of the rights
of an estranged wife before divorce. If the court had sold the house
and had given her half the proceeds, the result would have been to
reduce, at least temporarily, her house-occupying station in life by
one half. Normally when a marriage fails, the wife who has devoted
herself to domestic skills has few, if any, skills with which she can
compete in the labor market, while the husband has acquired more
earning capacity by developing skills in more demand on the labor
market. Second, married people tend to view their physically indi-
visible joint property not as half "his" and half "hers," but as "theirs"
in the sense that it would somehow be improper for either to alienate
his half interest without the consent of the other. In this sense the
marital entity may be more than an old common law concept: in
certain areas of behavior it is almost a psychological fact.
In fact this result, if not this analysis, would obtain in almost half
the jurisdictions today under the rationale that tenancy by the entirety
is neither partitionable nor salable for division.35 While in such juris-
dictions that result is restricted to married tenants,30 the Bernhard
result applies to all joint owners in Alabama since there is no distinc-
tion between married tenants and unmarried tenants.37 The importance
3 3 Ala. Code tit. 16 § 36 (1958).
34Simes & Smith, Future Interests § 1772 (2d ed. 1956).
2sSee Huber, Creditors' Rights In Tenancies By The Entireties, 1 Boston College
Industrial and Commercial L. Rev. 197, 198 (1959); Phipps, Tenancy By Entireties,
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of this difference between Alabama and other jurisdictions is that the
chief objections to tenancy by the entirety, creation of an estate with-
out full knowledge of technical results and possible defeat of creditors'
rights, now attach in Alabama to every joint estate in which the parties
have created a right of survivorship. If the only estate with survivor-
ship left by the court's interpretation of the statute is tenancy in
common with a right of survivorship, and if that kind of contingent
right of survivorship is indivisible because of the contingency of the
interests of the parties, it follows that every joint estate with sur-
vivorship is indivisible. It also must follow that since every joint
estate with survivorship is indivisible because of the contingency of
interests of the tenants, the estate is insulated against those who are
creditors of 1 spouse only. For if the reason for non-division is
that a contingent remainder is by its very nature indivisible, it is
immaterial whether a spouse or a creditor is trying to have it sold for
division. Thus every landowner in Alabama could by timely action
completely insulate his estate from attachment by creditors simply by
transferring it to himself and another as tenants in common for their
joint lives with the right of survivorship.38
Obviously, the court will at least have to modify or restrict its
Bernhard opinion. Just how it can do so without overruling Bernhard
is not clear. The case cannot be restricted on the basis of the intention
of the parties, since the intention of the parties in Bernhard was to
create a severable joint tenancy and not a tenancy in common with
an indestructible right of survivorship. There is no reason for restrict-
ing the opinion to married tenants since the statute (1842) applies to
all joint owners, 39 and the judicial abolition (1860) of tenancy by the
entirety leaves no distinction between married and unmarried joint
tenants.40
Apparently the case must be distinguished on some fictional ground
or it must be overruled. Assuming that the court wants to pursue
a policy of protection of the rights of an estranged wife even when
creditors are involved, it will probably limit this case in some way
to married tenants. If that happens, the court will have done some-
thing far more significant than fictionalize the result of the present
case: it will have reinstated tenancy by the entirety. Although there
may be a theoretical difference between the concept of tenancy by
3SAla. Code tit. 46 § 19 (1958) gives a landholder the power to make a




the entirety and tenancy in common with an indestructible right of
survivorship,41 the practical results of both estates are identical: the
creation of a joint estate between married tenants only, with an inde-
structible right of survivorship immune from attachment by creditors
of 1 spouse only.
If that is the direction of the opinion, it contains 3 serious
flaws. First, the court has created uncertainty as to what the sub-
stantive law of real property actually is. It is clear that the case must
be modified or overruled, but how is the practicing attorney to know
which? The court obviously has adopted the policy of protecting the
rights of the estranged wife by preventing the husband from forcing
sale of "their" property, but what will happen when that policy con-
flicts with the policy of protecting the rights of non-joint creditors?
Assuming that the court considered all relevant implications of its
decision, it has, in effect, weighed the advantages of tenancy by the
entirety against its disadvantages and decided that the advantages out-
weigh the disadvantages. Since the court did not even mention such
an obvious implication,42 the practicing attorney can only guess
whether it was considered, thus can only guess whether the court
actually wishes to pursue this policy when non-joint creditors are
involved.
A second flaw in the decision is the potential confusion the decision
has created in the language of property law. While a tenancy in
common with a right of survivorship is not exactly a technical con-
tradiction in terms, such terminology will create pointless confusion.
Although survivorship is not an estate itself, it is something more
than an alienable characteristic of an estate. It is the label that iden-
tifies the estate as either a joint tenancy or a tenancy by the entirety
and not a tenancy in common since a basic distinction between ten-
ancy in common and the other 2 joint estates is that survivorship
is not a feature of tenancy in common.43 Saying that survivorship is
only an incident of 1 estate which can arbitrarily be assigned to
another estate, while perhaps technically permissible,44 subject to the
requirements of due process, is like saying that having equestrian
4 1
A tenant by the entirety owns the whole estate while a tenant in common
with an indestructible right of survivorship owns only a part of the estate with
a contingent remainder in fee simple in the whole.
42-The point was raised neither in the opinion, nor in the brief of counsel
arguing for division of proceeds from forced sale, Brief for Appellee, Bernhard
v. Bernhard, 177 So. 2d 565 (Ala. 1965), and it could hardly be expected to be
raised in Appellant's Brief.
43See United States v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 363, 370 (1939); Moynihan, Introduc-
tion to Real Property, 220, 224, 229 (1962).
"4See supra note 41.
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characteristics is only an incident of an animal called a "horse'?. which
can arbitrarily be assigned to another animal. If the decision of the
court is that results uniquely obtainable from tenancy by the en-
tirety are desirable, it should overrule the 1860 case abolishing tenancy
by the entirety and avoid the kind of confusion which results from
a misdirected sense of reverence.
45
The third and basic flaw in this opinion, is its ad hoc approach
designed to deal with one particular problem of co-ownership with-
out proper regard for the whole body of co-ownership law. It was
this same approach that originally raised this problem in Walthall v.
Goree46 when the Supreme Court of Alabama abolished tenancy by
the entirety on the narrow ground that it was inconsistent with the
married women's property act.47 Bernhard treated the problem in the
same narrow way, and instead of considering the relation of a par-
ticular estate to the rest of joint ownership law, considered only the
relation of that particular estate to a particular statute. The approach
of trying to deal with the relation of one joint estate to one statute
or set of social conditions overlooks the problem that a significant
adjustment of any one common law joint estate necessitates a cor-
responding adjustment in some other common law joint estate. The
common law provided almost any kind of estate which the parties to
a conveyance wished to create, and when 1 of these estates is de-
prived of a useful feature by a narrow reading of a statute, then some
other estate must be adapted to fulfill that feature. The proper ap-
proach would be based on the realization that the utility of a particular
estate in modem property law is determined by its relation to other
joint estates as well as its relation to modern social conditions. Trying
to adjust joint tenancy to modern conditions without considering its
relation to gaps in the law left by tenancy in common and tenancy
by the entirety is as ludicrous as trying to adjust the flight pattern
of an airplane without considering weather conditions.
Unfortunately, this approach is not confined to the judiciary. This
is precisely the approach urged on courts and legislatures by many
legal periodicals, which seem more concerned with criticizing tenancy
45The Alabama approach seems to be that while the decision abolishing
tenancy by the entirety was not technically correct, it should not be over-
ruled because of its venerability. Goree, supra note 23, was based on an implicit
non sequitur; that because under the married women's property act tenancy
by the entirety was no longer mandatory, it was no longer permissible. See,




by the entirety than with creating a viable, integrated law of co-
ownership.4 8 This approach as well as its conclusion is suspect.
While the lack of compulsory division among tenants by the en-
tirety may frustrate the rights of some creditors who do not have
the signatures of both husband and wife or do not check their credit
properly, it does not follow that the estate should be abolished with-
out considering whether it serves any useful function. The Alabama
experience indicates that abolition of tenancy by the entirety does not
automatically improve the law of co-ownership. Moreover, it would
seem that protection of the wife's rights in jointly held property as
opposed to her husband's creditors is at least as appealing as protec-
tion from an estranged spouse.49
The proper suggestion to the legislature is to begin anew. It should
consider the reasons for and against all 3 common law joint estates
with an eye to rewriting the whole body of co-ownership law to fit
modem conditions. The final result would be surprisingly similar to
the common law. Such a statute could read:
§ 1. Any transfer to two or more persons jointly is presumed to
be a tenancy in common. This presumption is rebuttable only
by language on the face of the instrument expressly showing an
intent to set up a joint tenancy or a tenancy by the entirety.
§ 2. A common law joint tenancy with a destructible right of
survivorship may be created if that is the intent of the parties as
expressly manifested on the face of the instrument. Any tenants,
including husband and wife, may hold as joint tenants, and any
deed styled "with a right of survivorship" without stating wheth-
er it is intended to be a joint tenancy or a tenancy by the en-
tirety is presumed to be a joint tenancy.
§ 3a. A tenancy by the entirety with an indestructible right of
survivorship may be created between husband and wife, if such
intention is expressed on the face of the instrument, subject to
two limitations:
4SSee, e.g., Ritter, A Criticism Of The Estate By The Entirety, 5 Fla. L. Rev.
153 (1952); For less extreme examples, see English, Concurrent Estates in Real
Property 11 (pt. 2), 12 Catholic L. Rev. 1 (1963); Huber, Creditors' Rights In
Tenancies By The Entireties, 1 Boston College Industrial and Commercial L. Rev.
197 (1959); Comment, 42 U. Det. L.J. 362 (1965).
4OUnder existing law a strongly reasoned case can be made out for both
creditor and wife. While it seems inequitable to defeat the rights of the creditor
who has done all he may think is legally necessary to insure he will be paid,
it also seems inequitable to make the wife pay from her own property (and it
is her own property: per tout) for her husband's bad judgment in business.
1966] ."
